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OF OUTLAWS AND OFFLOADS: A CASE
FOR DERIVATIVE ENTRAPMENT
Consider the following scenario) Federal law enforcement agents
("Feds") conduct separate investigations of two Florida chapters of the
Outlaw Motorcycle Club ("Outlaws"): the Daytona chapter and the
Tampa chapter.' In Daytona, the Feds recruit a confidential informant
("CI") within the local chapter As the CI observes and records, the
leader of the chapter ("DK") directs its members to bomb the head-
quarters of a rival motorcycle gang and to raid another gang's club-
house. 4 Shortly thereafter, the Feds arrest the members of the Daytona
chapter.`'
In Tampa, an undercover agent infiltrates the local chapter!' The
Feds come to realize, however, that, with the exception of one member
("Hopper"), the five members of the Tampa chapter engage in crimi-
1 This Note borrows its opening scenario front the recent trial of 16 members and associates
of the Outlaw Motorcycle Club in the Tampa Division of the United States District. Court for the
Middle District of Florida. See Case at a Glance, NAT'L Li., May 15, 1995, at A10.
2 The Outlaw Motorcycle Club migrated from the Midwest to Florida in 1967. Bruce Viel-
metti, FBI Agent Describes History of Outlaw Gang, Si'. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 5, 1995, at B3. By
the late 1970s Florida had become the seat of its operations, although it maintained chapters in
12 other states. Id, Besides road trips to other chapters, these operations reputedly included
kidnapping women and coercing them into nude dancing and prostitution. Id.; see David Sommer,
Woman Testifies Biker Beat, Protected Her, TAtitivk Tam., May 31, 1995, at 5; Bruce Vielmetti,
Outlaw's "Old Lady" Testifies: I Had No Way Out, Sr. PETERSBURG Tim s, May 24, 1995, at Bi .
In the 1980s, federal law enforcement fix:used its sights upon the Florida chapters of the
Outlaw Motorcycle Club, bringing two nutior prosecutions against them, Bruce Vielmetti, U.S,
Paints Dark Picture of Outlaws, Sr. PETERSBURG 'FINIES, Apr. 25, 1995, at BI. In 1992, federal
authorities in the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the U.S. Drug Enforcement Admini-
stration ("IM1") and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") teamed with suite
law enforcement to initiate "Operation Shovelheacl" (a "show:Ills:ad" being a type of motorcycle
engine), an investigation or the Outlaws in'lantpa and St. Petersburg. David Sow mer,jabs Traded
at Closing of Outlaw Case, TAssea Taut., Aug. 11, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter 'ant Traded]; Bruce
Vielmetti, Outlaws' Lawyers Fault Government, ST, PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at 113 [here-
inafter Outlaws' Larers]. This undercover investigation operated separately Iron] ;Mother federal
investigation of Outlaws in Daytona that started subsequently, although the United States Auto-
ney's oilier combined the two, alter the fact, into a single indictment. See. Jabs Muted, supra.
:4 See David Sommer, informant Describes "Ambush" of Bikers, TAMPA TRI G ., May 9, 1995, al 6
[hereinafter in/Orniant].
4 See Pat LaMee & Jim Lensner, Agents Raid Outlaws Clubhouse, ORLANDO SENTINEI„ Mar. 1,
1995, at Cl; Informant, supra note 3, at 6; Bruce Vielmetti, Prosecution Rests in Outlaw Club Trial,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug, 8, 1995, at 141 [hereinafter Prosecution].
5 See LaMee and Leusner, supra note 4.
6 See David Sommer, Otainios Were in Shambles, Says Leader, TAmpA TRIB., at 6 [hereinafter
Shambles).
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nal activity only sporadically, if at all. 7
 In order to salvage the investiga-
tion, the Feds decide to institute a reverse sting in which the under-
cover agent will pay each Tampa Outlaw $1000 to offload bricks of
cocaine and bales of marijuana from a plane' The undercover agent
suggests the idea to Hopper and lobbies him to recruit the other four
Tampa Outlaws, insisting that the operation requires five men.' Hop-
per communicates the $1000 offer to his "brothers," and two sign on."'
Anxious to get the two more required of him, Hopper calls the St.
Petersburg chapter and enhances the offer, promising that each St.
Petersburg Outlaw at the offload will receive $1200." Two agree, and
a week later, Hopper, two Tampa Outlaws and two St. Petersburg
Outlaws travel to a designated hanger. 12
 They offload bales of mari-
juana and bricks of ersatz cocaine (plaster of Paris) interspersed with
actual cocaine, all requisitioned from an FBI warehouse, while a sur-
veillance camera records the entire event." Later, the Feds arrest
all five.
This motley investigation demonstrates three examples of a third
party persuading defendants to break the law. In Daytona, DK per-
suaded the other chapter members to either raid or bomb rival club-
houses, or both; in St. Petersburg, Hopper persuaded the St. Peters-
burg Outlaws to join the Tampa offload; and in Tampa, the undercover
agent importuned Hopper to solicit the Tampa Outlaws to offload
drugs. Because the CI in Daytona had no part in originating these
crimes, no court would allow the Daytona Outlaws to plead entrapment
as a defense." Nor would many courts allow the St. Petersburg Outlaws
to plead entrapment; although the Feds originated the scheme, they
7
 See Jeff Stidinun, Feds Seduced Outlaw Gang, Defense Says, MAIM TRIB., July 13, 1995, at 3;
Outlaws' Lawyffs, supra note 2.
" See Shambles, supra note 6; Outlaws' Lau yr.s, supra note 2; Prosecution, supra note 4.
9 See Outlaws' Lawyers, supra note 2.
I" See id.
II See id.
12 See id,
18
 See id.
14 See United States v. Martinez, 979 F.2d 1424, 1432 (10th Cir. 1992) (repudiating notion of
"private" entrapment—entrapment, not by government agent, but by private individual), cell.
denied, 507 U.S. 1022 (1993); United States v. Sartnietno, 786 F.2(1665, 668 (5th Cir. 1986) (same);
United States v. Leroux, 738 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing clear majority rule in federal
courts that entrapment defense does not extend to inducements by private citizen); see also
United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, 12 (3d Gin 1983); United States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d 593,
597-98 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Dove, 629 F.2d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 911 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979).
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did not have the St. Petersburg Outlaws in mind, and they did not
authorize the enhanced payment. 15
The most troubling scenario probably involves the two other
Tampa Outlaws. There, the Feds specifically targeted them and spe-
cifically authorized the terms of the inducement. Hopper merely com-
municated the inducement to them. Yet in most circuits, of all the
Tampa Outlaws lured to the hanger by the promise of a $1000 pay day,
only Hopper could raise a defense of entrapment. 16
At a time when law enforcement demonstrates an escalating pro-
clivity for the use of informants, undercover operations and "stings,"
one can hardly help but question the fairness of allowing law enforce-
ment to insulate itself from entrapment defenses by employing unsus-
pecting middlemen. 17 The difficulty inheres in elaborating a standard
that would distinguish between defendants like the Tampa Outlaws—
whom the Feds targeted and whose inducement the Feds created—and
those like the St. Petersburg Outlaws—whose involvement the Feds
15 See, e.g., Uniicil States v. Gonzales, 461 F.2d 1000, 100E (9th Cir,) (repudiating "vicarious"
entrapment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972). According to the Gonzales court, "a defendant
may not seek shelter tinder the defense of entrapment claimed by another." Id.
MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 317-18 (1989), In his examination of the
prevailing law of entrapment, Marcus concludes:
in the vast majority of jurisdictions, whether applying ohjective or subjective tests,
a strict standing hurdle must. be crossed before the entrapment defense can be
raised. Many courts have flatly declared that they "do not recognize ;1 concept of
derivative entrapment." The problem arises, of course. because of cases involving
multiple defendants where the government agent who arguably engages in undue
inducement directs those activities only against one or two of the defendants.
Id. In the actual Outlaws case, the Eleventh Circuit precedents established just. such a unilateral
repudiation of third party entrapment and thus constrained the district court from allowing many
of the defendants to raise entrapment defenses. E.g., United States v. Ambrose, 707 F.2d 1209,
1212-13 (Ildi Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983): United States v, Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1340
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983), Once the trial went to the jury, the issue of
entrapment resurfaced; three times during deliberations, the jury questioned whether the en-
trapment defense extended to defendants other than those whom the government had induced
directly. Bruce Vielmeth, Outlaws' jurors Ask Questions, Sr. PETERSEURC TIMEs, Aug. 23, 1995, at
83. The	 resentment over the Eleventh Circuit's blanket pr ohibition against third party
entrapment nearly restated in a mistrial. David Sommer, Outlaw Biker Gang Mistrial Averted,
TAMI'A TRILL, Aug. 23,1995, at 1. Ultimately, however, the jury returned verdicts against 14 of the
16 defendants. Bruce Viehnetti, SUM Outlaws FOUThl GUilly; Two Acquitted, Sr. l'ETERSISURG
Tusms, Aug. 30, 1995, at El. Afterwards, a number of jurors complained of being hamstrung by
the applicable law and voiced resentment over the methods employed by the Feds during the
investigation. jurors Say Good Guys Just as Bad as Outlaws, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 2, 1995, at
1)1
17 For an entertaining documentary on the proliferation of sting operations and popular
resentment against them, see The Sting, (A&E television broadcast, Nov. 23, 1994) (tracing
development of "stings," from prohibition through ABSCAM to present).
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never envisioned in the first place. The emergent theory of "derivative"
entrapment does just this. 18
This Note attempts to contextualize,.clarify and ultimately advo-
cate a derivative entrapment defense that would make itself available
to defendants like the Tampa Outlaws while drawing a line at defen-
dants like the St. Petersburg and Daytona Outlaws. Section I of this
Note provides background on the history, sources and logic of the
entrapment defense.' 9
 Section II examines the case law that has met
and struggled with issues of third party entrapment. 2° Section III dis-
cusses the 1995 decision in United States v. Hollingsworth by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and suggests that its
holding may do more harm than good to the case for a derivative
entrapment defense. 21
 Finally, Section IV distills from the cases a stand-
ard for derivative entrapment and argues that, so structured, the de-
fense remains consistent with the traditional logic and purposes of the
en trapment defense. 22
I. THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
The defense of entrapment does not arise from the Constitution
or the constitutional rights of the defendant." Rather, the Supreme
18
 As this Note defines it, "derivative entrapment" collies into play when the government
targets a distant defendant and transmits inducements for that person to commit a crime through
an unwitting middleman. See infra notes 167-86 and accompanying text.
IS See infra notes 26-58 and accompanying text.
20 
.See infra notes 59-142 and accompanying text.
21
 See United Stales v. Hollingsworth 27 F.3(1 1196, 1204 (7th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (Posner, J.)
[hereinafter Hollingsworth II; see infra notes 143-64 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 165-202 and accompanying text.
23 United State,s v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430-31 (1973). In Russell, the Court rejected a
substantive Due Process theory of entrapment, distinguishing between the federal entrapment
defense and the exclusionary remedies constitutionalized in Miranda v. Arizona anti 141app v.
Ohio insofar as the defendant raising an entrapment defense had suffered no violation of a
constitutional right. Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
The Russell Court conceded, however, that "we may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." 411 U.S.
au 431-32. In Hampton v. United States, a majority of justices agreed, although justice Powell
cautioned that "[p]olice overinvolvement in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of
outrageousness before it could bar convictions." 425 U.S. 484, 495 11.7 (1976) (Powell,,]., concur-
ring). These dicta acted as the fountainhead for a constitutional affirmative defense, similar to,
but distinct from, entrapment. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90. Where the Court's entrapment
decisions look to "federal common law," this emergent defense of "Government Misconduct"
invokes constitutional Due Process rights. See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 67
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90. And unlike entrapment, the
Government Misconduct defense may be decided by the court as a matter of law according to a
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Court of the United States has fashioned the entrapment defense out
of its authority to define federal procedure. 24 Thus, Congress may
modify the entrapment defense at any time or do away with it alto-
gether." Likewise, the states may create their own versions of the
defense, revise them or elaborate upon them. 26
The Court first recognized the entrapment defense in 1932, in
Sorrels v. United States. 27 In Sorrels, an undercover prohibition agent
repeatedly solicited the defendant, to secure a gallon of whiskey as a
favor to a fellow veteran." In holding that the agent had entrapped
the defendant "as a matter of law," the Supreme Court considered it
determinative that the defendant had evinced no predisposition to
commit such a crime. 2" The Sorrels Court's entrapment analysis thus fo-
cused on the subjective disposition of the defendant and asked whether
that person was "engaged in criminal enterprises" (and therefore in-
eligible to raise the defense) or whether the individual was "an inno-
totality of the circumstances test. See, e.g., United States v. Tobias, (162 E2d 381, 587 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982). Perhaps because of this, the Government Misconduct
defense has gained a certain cache among defense lawyers. especially on appeal. See United States
v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1423 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that Russell. "dicta" has inspired over 200
Government Misconduct defenses), rest denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426 (1995). Despite this cache,
however, the Government Misconduct defense has remained a distinctly difficult row flu' defen-
dants to hoc. See, e.g., id. at 1425, 1428 (observing that only one appellate court has barred
prosecution on basis of government misconduct); see also United States v. Santana, 6 1.3d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1993) (deriding government misconduct defense as "death lied child of objective
entrapment, a doctrine long since discarded in federal courts"). But (f. Rodin) v, California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that forced stomach-pumping of defendant violated Due Process Clause
of Riurteenth Amendment).
21 See Sherman V. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1957) (Frankfurter, j., concurring in
the judgment).
25 Russell 411 U.S. at 433 ("Since the defense is not of a constitution:it dimension, Congress
nay address itself to the question and adopt any substantive definition of the defense that it may
find desirable.").
21i Twenty-live states and Puerto Rico have enacted their own statutory versions of t h e entrap-
ment defense. See Ai A. CODE § 13A-3-3I (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (1995); ARIL CODE
ANN. § 5-2-209 (Michie 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-709 (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-15
(1994); Del,. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 432 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (1905); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 702-237 (1995); hi,. ANN. STAT. Ch. 720, para. 7-12 (Smith-Fiord 1993); INn, Coot.; ANN.
§ 35-41-3-9 (Burns 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3210 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 505.010
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995); Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.066 (1994); Murry. Coot; ANN. § 45-2-213
(1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (1994); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:2-12 (1994); N.Y. PENAL. Law
§ 40.05 (Consul. 1995); N.D. CEN -r. Com § 12.1-05-11 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 161,275 (1994);
18 PA. CONS, STAT, § 313 (1995); TENN. Coo ANN. § 39-11-505 (1995); TEx, PENAL. CODE ANN.
§ 8.06 (West 1996); UTAH Coin ANN. § 76-2-303 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.070 (1995);
P.R. Laws ANN. tit 33, § 3094 (1991).
27 287 U.S. 435, 437 (1932).
2S Id. at 439-40.
29 Id. at 441, 452.
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cent person."'" In dissent, Justice Roberts bridled at the notion that
government conduct may escape constitutional censure with regards
to one defendant but not with regards to another.st His dissent has
served as the progenitor of a line of separate opinions urging an
"objective" standard for entrapment, one that focuses solely on the
government's conduct. 32
In 1958, in Sherman v. United States, the Supreme Court returned
to the entrapment defense." In Sherman, the government's informant
importuned the defendant for drugs several times after an initial meet-
ing in a doctor's office where they both were seeking treatment for
drug addiction." Ultimately, the defendant capitulated, although he
sold the narcotics to the government informant for cost." On appeal,
Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction of the defendant, setting forth what has become the
classic, bipartite entrapment analysis:
(1) did the agent induce the accused to commit the offence
charged in the indictment;
(2) if so, was the accused ready and willing without permis-
sion and was he awaiting any propitious opportunity to com-
mit the offense.
On the first question the accused has the burden; on the
second question the prosecution has it.st'
In affirming the Second Circuit's decision and holding that the
defendant in Sherman had been entrapped as "a matter of law," the
United States Supreme Court also reaffirmed the second prong of
this analysis—the inquiry into the defendant's predisposition—em-
phasizing that the gravamen of the entrapment defense is to pro-
3" ltd. at 441-42.
31 Id. at 458-59 (Roberts, j., dissenting). justice Roberts wrote:
Whatever may be the demerits of the defendant or his previous infractions of law
these will not justify the instigation and creation of a new clime .... To say that
such conduct by an official of government is condoned and rendered innocuous
by the fact that the defendant had a bad reputation or had previously transgressed
is wholly to disregard the basis for the reason for refusing the processes of the court
to consummate an abhorrent transaction.
Id. (Roberts, j., dissenting).
n See, e.g., Hampton, 425 U.S. at 496-97; Russell, 411 U.S. at 437-38 (Douglas, j., dissenting);
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 379-83; Sorrels, 287 U.S. at 441-42 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
33 356 U.S. at 369.
5'1 Id. at 371.
33 /d.
3' United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880,882-83 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Eland, J.), aff'd, 356
U.S. 369 (1957).
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hibit the government from laying a trap for the "unwary innocent,"
while still allowing it to lay one for the "unwary criminal." 37 Again,
however, a portion of the Court favored a more "objective" ap-
proach, one that truncated the analysis at the first, "inducement"
prong, eschewing an inquiry into the defendant's predisposition."
In a pair of decisions in the -1970s, the Supreme Court resisted
expanding the entrapment defense further, preferring to leave the
entrapment defense to juries." In 1973, in United States v. Russell, the
Supreme Court held that the government had not entrapped a defen-
dant as "a matter of law" despite the fact that it had supplied him with
the essential ingredient to manullicture narcotics." In a 5-4 decision,
the Court emphasized that entrapment should be a matter for juries
to decide, not another weapon for judges looking to check law enforce-
ment. 4 ' Once again, though, a minority of the Court favored an "ob-
jective" approach, insisting that the trial judge should rule on an
entrapment defense "as a matter of law," and that the judge should
focus exclusively on the government's conduct. 42
In 1976, in Hampton v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court held that, even where the government. furnished all the narcotics
in the transaction, a defendant convicted for trafficking in heroin was
not entitled to an entrapment defense so long as he was predisposed
to commit the crime." Despite the active role the government had
played in the operation, the Court concluded that the jury could have
found the defendant predisposed to commit the crime.'" Yet again,
however, a four-member minority of the Court rejected the majority's
"subjective" version of the defense in favor of an "objective" version of
:47 356 U.S. al 372.
38 See id. at 382-83 (Franklurter,.1., concurring in the judgment). Justice Frankfurter wrote:
No matter what the def'endant's past record and present inclinations to criminality,
or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police
conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to he tolerated by int advanced
society. . . . Permissible police activity does not vary according to the particular
defendant concerned .... Past crimes do n o t forever outlaw the criminal told open
him to police practices ... from which the ordinary citizen is protected.
M. (Frankfurter, I., concurring in the judgment),
a' See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490; Russell, 411 U.S. at 436.
4° 41. I U.S. at 425, 436.
41 Id. at 435.
42 Id. ;0 436 (Brennan,.I., dissenting) (siding with "objective" theories of Justices Roberts and
Frankfurter): id. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("pfThis objective approach to entrapment
advanced by the Roberts opinion in Sorrells and the Frankfurter opinion in Sherman is the only
one truly consistent with the tint rationale of the defense.").
43 425 U.S. at 485, 490-91.
44 Id. at 489-90.
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entrapment, focusing solely on the (mis)conduct of the government,
as decided by the judge, not the jury:15
In 1988, in Mathews v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
a defendant could raise the seemingly inconsistent defenses of inno-
cence and entrapment. 46 In his capacity as an official at the municipal
Small Business Administration, the defendant in Mathews accepted
loans from a cooperating individual: 17 Because the defendant refused
to admit all elements of the charge, the trial judge denied his motion
to raise an entrapment defense. 48 Drawing an analogy to Rule 8(e) (2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows civil defendants
to raise inconsistent defenses, the Supreme Court concluded that a
criminal defendant could raise an entrapment defense without admit-
ting the elements of the crime. 49 Notably, in a concurring opinion, the
decades-long proponent of the objective theory of entrapment, Justice
Brennan, seemed to put the objective-subjective controversy to rest:
"Were I judging on a clean slate, I would still be inclined to adopt the
view that the entrapment defense should focus exclusively on the
Government's conduct. But I am not writing on a clean slate. The
Court has spoken definitively on this point.""
The Supreme Court's most recent exposition of the entrapment
defense came in 1992, in Jacobson v. United States, when the Court held
that, by soliciting the defendant to buy child pornography over a
two-year period, the government had entrapped him as a matter of
law.'' The defendant in Jacobson was a Nebraska farmer in 1985 when
federal law enforcement agencies singled him out for an undercover
sting and indictment under the Child Protection Act through a mailing
list." After two years of correspondence with various fictitious organi-
zations ostensibly devoted to the appreciation of child pornography,
the defendant placed an order." Shortly thereafter, he was arrested
and subsequently convicted, despite raising an entrapment defense. 54
45 Id. at 497 (Brennan, j., dissenting). justice Brennan explained that "Milder [an objective]
approach, the determination of the lawfulness of the Government's conduct must he made—as
it is on all questions involving the legality of law enforcement methods—by the trial judge, not
the jury.' Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 441 (Brennan, j., dissenting)).
46 485 U.S. 58, 66 (1988).
47 Id. at 60.
4M Id. at 61,
4" Id. at 64, 66.
5(1 1d. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring). Some states, however, continue to apply an "objective"
version of entrapment. See, e.g., People v. McIntire, 501 P.2d 527, 528 (Cal. 1979).
51 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1902).
52 Id. at 1537-4(1.
" Id. at 1530-40.
54 Id.
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The Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict, however, thereby resus-
citating the doctrine of entrapment as a matter of law, which had
remained dormant since the 1958 Sherman opinion." Nonetheless, the
Jacobson Court did not simultaneously resuscitate the objective version
of entrapment; instead, it rested its analysis on the paucity of evidence
suggesting that, prior to government involvement, the defendant had
harbored the predisposition to engage in such criminal conduct.'"
The Supreme Court's entrapment decisions reveal that the Court
is striving to remain true to the doctrine's impetus: that is, the judici-
ary's refusal to countenance government seduction of otherwise inno-
cent citizens.'7 Although the Court has wavered on whether entrap-
ment is solely a matter for the jury or whether it may be decided as a
matter of law, it has steadfastly resisted adopting an "objective" theory
of entrapment that would focus exclusively on the conduct of the
government." As the Supreme Court has defined it, the entrapment
doctrine does not consider the government's conduct in a vacuum.
Entrapment, rather, always situates that conduct relative to the particu-
lar defendant.
II. ENTRAPMENT BY A THIRD PARTY
As the predisposition prong ascended in importance in the Su-
preme Court's entrapment jurisprudence, the other prong of the en-
trapment analysis (the objective, or government inducement, prong)
seemed to diminish to a near vestigial significance.'' Nonetheless, the
issue of inducement remains pivotal in defining whose inducements
may result in entrapment and, thus, who may raise it. as a clefense.'" )
55 14. at 1543 ("Rational jurors co u ld not say beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
possessed the requisite predisposition [T]he prosecution failed, as a matter of law, to adduce
evidence to support the jury verdict that petitioner was predisposed . . . to violate the law[.]")
(emphasis added). In so doing, the Court gave the lie to the circuits that had, in the interim
between Sherman and Jacobson, asserted that entrapment as a matter of law was effectively
moribund. See, e.g., United States v. Markovic, 911 F.2d 613,616 (11t1t Cir, 1990).
55 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541-42.
57
 See Sorrels, 287 U.S. at 441-42.
58 E.g„ Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1511-42 (inquiring into defendant's predisposition to commit
crime). Compare Russell 411 U.S. at 135 (suggesting lila( entrapment should go to jury) with
Jacobson, 1 12 S. Ct. at 1543 (deciding entrapment as a matter of law).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Hollingsvror114 9 17.3d 593,597 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) there-
inafter Hollingsworth 1] ('Tile elements of inducement and predisposition have tended to merge,
More precisely, inducement has tended to merge into predisposition, now often cited as the
principal element of the defense."), affil en bane, 27 F.3d 1197 (1994); we (its() United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973) (calling predisposition the "principle element" in entrapment.
defense).
88 E.g., United States v. Garcia, 546 F.2d 613,615 (5th Cir. 1977). The Garcia court conceded
that predisposition is the "principal element" in the defense but maintained the importance of
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The Supreme Court cases show that entrapment can occur through an
undercover agent, a confidential informant or a private citizen know-
ingly acting under the direction of government agents. 61
Less clear is when, if ever, entrapment can occur through a third
party who is not knowingly furthering a government scheme. 62 One
can divide the cases that have dealt with the issue of entrapment
through a third party into three variations upon the theme: (i) "private
entrapment," in which one private individual, of his own will, induces
the defendant to commit a crime; (ii) "vicarious entrapment," in which
a private individual, himself induced by a government agent or official,
induces the defendant to commit a crime; and (iii) "derivative entrap-
ment" in which a private individual, acting as an "unsuspecting mid-
dleman," "transmits" the inducements offered him by a government
agent or official in order to "net" the "distant defendant." 63
A. Private Entrapment
Returning to the Florida Outlaws, specifically the Daytona chapter,
one might recall that their leader, DK, persuaded the rest to bomb a
rival gang's clubhouse and to ambush another gang, and that the
government's informant merely recorded their activities." Were any of
the Daytona Outlaws to raise an entrapment defense, they would be
raising one of private entrapment: i.e., entrapment by a party wholly
unrelated to the government. 65
 As one would expect, the circuits have
roundly and unanimously disallowed such a radical expansion of the
inducement insofar as "(tike conduct with which the defense of entrapment is concerned is the
manufacturing of crime by law enforcement officials and their agents." Id. (quoting Lopez v.
United Suites, 373 U.S. 427, 434 (1963)).
61 See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1538-40 (1992) (entrapment through
undercover agent); Mathews v. United Stales, 485 U.S. 883, 885 (1988) (entrapment through
private citizens under direction of agents); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 486-87 (1976)
(same); Russell, 411 U.S. at 425 (entrapment through undercover agent); Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 371 (1958) (entrapment through confidential informant); Sorrels v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1932) (entrapment through undercover agent).
62
 See United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1986).
,S're United States v. Hodges. 936 F.2d 371, 372 (8th Cir. 1991) (describing derivative
entrapment); United States v. Pilarinos, 864 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1988) (same); United States
v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1168 (2d Cir. 1980) (depicting vicarious entrapment); United States
v. Garcia, 546 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir.) (depicting private entrapment), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 958
(1977). Although a number of courts have used these terms interchangeably, others have increas-
ingly recognized distinctions between them. Compare United States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d 593,
597-98 (9th Cir. 1982) (using terms interchangeably) and United States v. Leroux, 738 F.2d 943,
947 (8th Cir. 1984) (same) with Hollingsworth 11, 27 F.3d at 1204 (distinguishing between terms).
64 See .supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
E.g., United States v. Barkley, 591 F.2d 903, 911 11.15 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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entrapment defense.° This consensus draws on the realization that
"tmlost crimes are the result of an inducement of one sort or another;
from Adam onward temptation has not been a per se excuse." 67 Or, as
the Seventh Circuit has suggested, "[p]rivate entrapment is just an-
other term for criminal solicitation, and outside the narrow haven
created by the defense of necessity or compulsion, the person who
yields to the solicitation and commits the solicited crime is guilty of
that crime.""
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in the 1974 case of United States v. Maddox is paradigmatic. [''' In
_Maddox, the defendants entered into a "stolen-shirt" sting arranged by
private investigators. 70 The defendants sought to raise an entrapment
defense, despite the fact that the private investigators conducted the
sting without police involvement.'' The Maddox court dismissed the
defendants' proposed entrapment. defense with the seemingly self-evi-
dent observation that "110 he entrapment defense does not extend to
inducement by private individuals.""
B. Vicarious Entrapment
A more difficult question involves the plight of the St. Petersburg
Outlaws." The Feds created the opportunity for their criminal activity
through the inducements offered to their Tampa cohorts; nonetheless,
the Feds had no designs on the St. Petersburg Outlaws, and the in-
ducement offered them by the unsuspecting middleman, Hopper,
differed from the original inducement offered by the Feds. 74 A few
courts, and at least one commentator, have concluded that defendants
in the position of the St. Petersburg Outlaws can raise a defense of
''" See, e.g., United States v. Martinet, 979 F.2d 1424, 1432 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Sarmiento, 786 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1986); Leroux, 738 F.2d at 947; United Slates v. Beverly,
723 F.2d 11, 12 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Shapiro, 660 F.2d 593, 597-98 (4th Cir, 1980).
67 United States v. Bradley, 820 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1987).
68 Minutia, 791 F.2d at 1269.
69 492 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S, 851 (1974).
7° M.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See Manzella, 791 F.2c1 at 1269-70. The Mantella court raised the question: "1S1liould the
government's lack of control over persons who are not its agents be a complete defense to any
elthrt to use the conduct of such a person as the basis for a defense.  of entrapment by someone
with whom the government has not dealt directly?" Id.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 6-13. The Second Circuit phrased this query more
abstractly:
if A is a government agent who induces 11 and 11 gets C involved, and if C has no
knowledge of the inducement of B by A or has never been introduced to A, can C
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vicarious entrapment. 75
 A great many more, however, have abjured the
theory of vicarious entrapment as a procedural Pandora's box of un-
foreseen defendants and unintended crimes. 76
Those courts that have endorsed the vicarious entrapment de-
fense have often focused on the fitct that its absence leaves an "unwary
innocent" defenseless." In 1957, in United States v. Klosterman, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that an
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") agent had entrapped the defendant
by inducing another IRS agent to persuade the defendant's insurance
representative to involve the defendant in a bribery scheme. 78 The
court concluded that the first IRS agent had entrapped the second,
and the second had entrapped the insurance man. 7" Thus, the second
agent acted as the first's unwitting agent in entrapping the insurance
representative, and the insurance agent acted as the second's unwitting
agent in entrapping an innocent person. 8" Accordingly, the Klosterman
court concluded, the government had entrapped the defendant, albeit
transitively. 8 '
In 1980, in United States v. Valencia, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a defendant may raise an
entrapment defense, even when the government has not targeted him
or contacted him directly. 82 The defendant in Valencia, along with his
wife, entered into an undercover drug buy." Because only the defen-
dant's wife had interacted directly with the government's agents, the
nevertheless argue entrapment on the ground that he would not have become
involved but for the original inducement by A?
United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1168 n.10 (2d Car. 1980).
75 Valencia, 645 F.2d at 1168; United Stales v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1957);
Hassel v. Mathues, 22 17.2d 979, 980 (E.D. Pa. 1927); Note, Entrapment Through Unsuspecting
Middlemen, 95 HAAN'. L. REv. 1122, 1129 (1982) ("[E]ven when the government has no reason
to suspect that a target of an investigation will induce a nonessential collaborator to join in
criminal activity, the third party should be able to plead entrapment if it is found that the initial
target was himself entrapped.").
76 E.g., Martinez, 979 F.2d at 1432; United States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 1989);
United States v. biers, 701 F.2c1 1321, 1390 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983); Cuba-
jal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 1968).
77 See Carbajal-Partillo, 396 F.2d at 947 ( -Hots we have the paradoxical situation in which the
principal participant goes free because he was entrapped, while his lesser confederate must
remain in prison and serve his sentence unless the 'umbrella' of [the principal's] entrapment is
stretched to cover [the lesser] as well.").
76 248 F.2c1 191, 193-94, 196 (3d Cir. 1957).
79 Id. at 196.
"9 Id,
Id.
82 645 F.2d at 1168.
53 Id, at 1161.
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trial judge instructed the jury that the defendant could not raise an
entrapment defense." The Second Circuit, however, reversed the trial
court, issuing a broad ruling:
If a person is brought into a criminal scheme after being
informed indirectly of conduct or statements by a govern-
ment agent which could amount to inducement, then that
person should be able to avail himself of the defense of
entrapment just as may the person who receives the induce-
ment directly."
The Valencia court's holding ran counter to the prevailing rule
among the circuits against allowing such a defense of vicarious entrap-
ment." Courts in the majority of circuits have pointed out that the
entrapment defense does not turn solely on the defendant's innocence
but also on the government's mendacity.87 In other words, although
vicarious entrapment may serve the purpose of the predisposition (or
subjective) prong of the entrapment defense—protecting the "unwary
innocent"—it ignores the purpose of the inducement (or objective)
prong of the defense—discouraging certain government conduct.88
Moreover, some courts have recognized practical dilemmas in
expanding the entrapment defense to accommodate a vicarious en-
trapment doctrine." First and foremost among them is the potential
proliferation of entrapment defenses among defendants whom the
84 Id. at 1163-64.
85 Id. at 1168.
86 Id, at 1174-75 (Van Graaleiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (collecting
cases); see, e.g., Marren, 890 F.2d at 931 n.2; United States v. Gonzales, 461 1 7.2d 1000, 1001 (9th
Cir.), re-rt. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); see also State v. Perez, 438 So. 2d 436, 438 (Ha. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) . Wend(' is read to Meat) that a defendant has available to [dill an entrapment
defense simply because another, himself entrapped, induced the defendant to commit the crime,
then Valencia stands alone For this proposition and is of little help to [defendant] in light of the
otherwise universal (and, in our view, correct) rejection of the vicarious entrapment defense.").
Carbajal-Partillo, 396 F.2d at 948.
"See Martinez, 979 F.2d at 1432. The Martinez court noted:
l'fibe purpose behind the entrapment defense is to prohibit the government from
directly involving an otherwise disinterested and disinclined person from commit-
ting a criminal offense. When the government has no contact with the accused,
that purpose has no relevance; therefore, without direct govermnent communica-
tion with the defendant, there is no basis for the entrapment defense,
Id.
" See, e.g., United Suites v. Sartniento, 786 F,2(1 665, 668 (5th Cir. 1986) (asserting that
vicarious entrapment leads to "untenable rule that codefendants' continunications among each
other concerning the government agents' undercover scheme automatically raises the possibility
of entrapment").
756	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vu]. 37:9
government had never targeted in the first place." One state court has
noted an equally troubling dilemma—the possibility that a defendant
may gain immunity for a crime that the government never envisioned. 91
Perhaps out of wariness of both the theoretical and practical
difficulties that attend vicarious entrapment, many circuit and state
courts have adopted rigid, per se rules against any entrapment through
a third party." In 1983, in United Slates v. Beverly, for instance, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, where
one defendant had brought the other into an arson scheme at the
behest of an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
("ATF"), the second could not raise an entrapment defense." In Bev-
erly, a paid informant introduced the first defendant and another party
to the ATF agent who proceeded to offer them $3000 to burn down a
building."' When the other party backed out of the scheme, the ATF
agent asked the first defendant to fi nd another partner." After the first
defendant brought in the second, the ATF agent supplied them with
gasoline and drove them to a government-owned building, which they
proceeded to set afire(' The Beverly court did not analyze the relation-
ship between the ATF agent's entreaties and the second defendant. 97
Instead, the court took it as self-evident that a defendant who had not
been directly solicited by the government agent could not raise an
entrapment defense,"
9" See Hollingsworth 1, 9 F.3d at 602. The Seventh Circuit opined,
The concern with recognizing a defense of vicarious entrapment is that it would
enormously complicate the trial of criminal cases. in any case in which a govern-
ment undercover agent or infOrmant had been used, defendants with whom he had
not dealt face to Face or even over the phone could argue with more or less
plausibility that the real criminal with whom they had dealt had merely been
transmitting the inducements furnished by the agent or informant."); Valencia, 645
F2d at 1179 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting from denial of en bane) ("If the panel
opinion is now the law of this Circuit, a DEA agent who hereafter solicits the sale
of drugs by one person may find to his surprise that he has entrapped a nationwide
plum of conspirators.
Id.
91 People v. Vo Thatth Thoi, 261 Cal. kw. 789, 792 (1989) (IT] he defense must show at a
minimum that the improper police practice yielded the charged crime. Otherwise, a defendant
would have tantamount to a get-out-of-jail-free card for the first crime he commits after the
improper police activity.").
92 E.g., United States v. Ambrose, 707 F.2d 1209, 1212-13 (11th Cir.), rerl. denied, 964 U.S.
986 (1983).
913 723 F.2d 11. 12 (3d Cir. 1983) (per curiam),
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 1l.
97 See id.
98
 Beverly, 723 F.2cl at 12.
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Similarly, in 1983, in United States v. Mars, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals also employed a cut-and-dry approach to the issue
of third party entrapment.• In Miffs, a government informant ap-
proached the original suspect with a scheme to sell drugs.n 1 That
suspect eventually agreed, and he and his son engaged in a number
of conversations with undercover agents to arrange it.'"' Confronted
with the question of whether the son could raise an entrapment de-
fense, the Court cursorily noted that the son had been induced origi-
nally by his father and then pronounced, "[w]hile [the son's] vicarious
entrapment theory is ingenious, it is not the law." 102
C. Derivative Entrapment
The thorniest bramble in this Note's opening scenario involves
the Tampa Outlaws. 1"3 The government targeted each of them, but its
agent only induced one directly, relying on him to communicate the
inducement to the others.'" In circuits or states whose courts have
resorted to a blanket prohibition against any sort of third party entrap-
ment, the Tampa Outlaws could not raise an entrapment defense.w 5
An emergent strain of case law, however, would allow them to raise a
defense of "derivative en trapment." 101
1. The Development of the Derivative Entrapment Defense in the
Federal Courts
In 1980, in United States v. Anderton, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a defendant who had been induced by the govern-
ment through an unsuspecting middleman could nonetheless raise an
entrapment defense.' 07 The unsuspecting middleman in Anderton of-
119 701 F.2d 1321, 1340 (1 Rh Cir.), ceri. denied, 464 U.S. 1)111 (1983).
1 °° Id. at 1324.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1340.
107 Manzella, 791 F.2d at 1269. In dicta, the Seventh Circuit raised the question: "Could the
government be allowed RI do indirectly, through ... an unwitting agent what it would not have
been allowed to do in face-to-face dealingsPr Id.
"See supra text accompanying notes 6-13.
1 °5 See, e.g., United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995) ("This Circuit....
does not recognize the theory or 'derivative entrapment.'").
1 N United! States v. Neal, 990 F.2(1 3115, 358 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hodges, 936 F.2d
371, 372 (8th Cir. 1991); Pilarinos, 864 17.2d at '255-56; Bradley, 820 F.2d at 7; United States v.
Anderton, 629 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. 1080); United States v. jannotti, 501 F. Stipp. 1182,
1202-03 (ED. Pa. 1980), repil on other grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982), rtfrd, 729 1".2d 213
(3d Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984).
107 629 F.2d at 1045, 1047.
758	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 37:4
fered a bribe to an IRS agent to use his influence to call off an
investigation of his bookmaking operation.m Feigning corruption, the
IRS agent accepted the bribe and then persuaded the middleman to
involve the defendant, who had earned a gambling conviction some
fifteen years earlier.m Noting that the Supreme Court had never lim-
ited the entrapment defense to those directly induced by government
agents, the Anderton court concluded that the government had effec-
tively entrapped the defendant through "an ignorant pawn."'")
Later that year, in United States v. jannotti, the United States
District Court fOr the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, acquitting two defendants charged
under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") on the ground that the evidence at trial established deriva-
tive entrapment as a matter of law."' The undercover operation in
jannotti stemmed from an investigation carried out by FBI agents to
uncover official corruption in New jersey." 2
 The ruse involved the
agents posing as representatives of a wealthy sheik who was exploring
investment opportunities in America. 13 Having garnered convictions
in New Jersey, the FBI shifted the operation to Philadelphia."' They
brought along one of the targets of the earlier investigation, the mayor
of Camden, who still labored under the delusion that he was dealing
with a wealthy sheik." 5 The FBI then convinced the mayor and a
Philadelphia lawyer to make overtures on behalf of the "sheik" toward
the defendants, two members of the Philadelphia City Council, offer-
ing them "consulting fees" in exchange for vague commitments to a
casino proposal.""
In spite of the Government's insistence that the two city council-
men could not raise entrapment defenses, the jannotti court concluded
that something less than wholesale vicarious entrapment was at issue
insofar as the government agents had selected the targets, induce-
ments and (mis)representations of the unsuspecting middlemen."'
" Id. at 1045.
lull Id. at 1045-46,
11 " Id. at 1047.
111 501 F. Supp. at 1202-03,1205. Although the irannotti decision was later reversed, the Third
Circuit did not rule on the district court's holding vis-a-vis derivative entrapment. See jannotti
United States, 729 F,2d 213,225 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984).
112Jamtuiti, 501 F. Supp. at 1193-99.
113
 Id. at 1193.
10 Id. at 1195.
li' Id. at 1193,1196.
" 6 Id. at 1195-99.
lanigti, 501 F. Stipp. at 1202.
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Accordingly, the court held that, absent a showing of predisposition by
the Government, the FBI had entrapped the city councilmen as a
matter of law."
In 1993, in United States v. Neal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit used a similar analysis to hold that a defendant
whom the government had not targeted in its undercover drug buy
could not raise an entrapment defense after getting involved. 1 '" In Neal,
a government informant negotiated a drug buy with a suspect. 12() The
suspect then called on the defendant to supply the drugs, which he
did. 121 In iLS conclusion that the government had not entrapped the
defendant, the Neal court considered it dispositive that the govern-
ment had not originally set its sights upon him.' 22 Had the govern-
ment asked the suspect to involve the defendant in the drug buy, the
Neal court suggested, the defendant could have raised an entrapment
defense. 122
2. The Development of the Derivative Entrapment Defense in State
Courts
In 1979, in People v. McIntire, the Supreme Court of California
held that an undercover agent who had enjoyed no contact with the
defendant had nonetheless entrapped her through her unsuspect-
ing brother.' 24 The government agent in McIntire was a local police
officer who had been posing as a high school student.' 25 Upon hearing
that the defendant dealt drugs, the agent sought out the defendant's
brother at school and began to pressure the brother to ask the defen-
dant to supply him with some marijuana. 12 "
The McIntire court noted that if the blanket prohibition against
entrapment through a third party were indeed the law, then the gov-
ernment could effectively evade the entrapment defense, achieving
ends indirectly that it could not achieve directly.' 27 By holding that the
defendant could raise a derivative entrapment defense, the McIntire
court rejected such tortured literalism and sent a message that
118 Id. at [203.
119 990 F.2d 355, 358 (8th Cir. 1993).
1211 1d. at 356-57.
121 id .
122 id. at 358.
11  See id.
124 591 1'.2d 527, 531 (Cal. 1979).
125 M. at 529.
111 1d.
127 Id. at 530.
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"[i]mproper governmental instigation of crime is not immunized be-
cause it is effected indirectly through a pliable medium." 128
In 1986, in Commonwealth v. Silva, a Massachusetts Appeals Court
held that the derivative entrapment defense did not extend to a defen-
dant whom the government had not targeted and to whom the gov-
ernment's inducements had not flowed.' 29 In Silva, the state police
made the first defendant the subject of a narcotics investigation.' 3"
Undercover agents visited his bar and told him that they wanted to buy
cocaine.' 3 ' The first defendant responded negatively but later referred
them to the second defendant, a patron at the bar.' 32
 The second
defendant told the first to have them return the next day.'" The agents
did and again solicited the first defendant who again referred them to
the second.'" This time, the second defendant delivered the cocaine
to the first who then delivered it to the agents.'"
The Silva court denied that the second defendant could raise a
defense of derivative entrapment. 136
 The court emphasized that the
state police had no reason to believe that their investigation of the first
defendant would involve the second. 137 The court also pointed out that
the second defendant acted out of friendship toward the first, not as
a response to the agents' inducement. "8 Nonetheless, the court explic-
itly avoided ruling against a derivative entrapment defense as a matter
of law.'" Rather, the Silva court set two conditions for a valid derivative
entrapment defense: the government must have some designs on the
distant defendant, and the middleman must communicate the govern-
ment's inducement to him or her.' 40
Increasingly, both federal and state courts have recognized the
plausibility of allowing a narrow version of third party entrapment that
would hold the state or federal government accountable when it pur-
posefully transmits its inducements through an unwitting middle-
man to net a distant defendant."' In so doing, these courts have dis-
1 " Id. at 530-31,
129 488 N.E.2d 34, 41-42 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
130 1d. at 35.
131 Id.
33 '4 M. at 35-36.
I " Id. at 36.
334
 Silva, 488 N.E.2d at 36.
/35 id.
136 14. at 41-42.
137 1d. at 42.
138
139 Silva, 488 N.E.2d at 41.
14°M.
141 See, e.g., Neal, 990 I2d at 358; Hodges, 936 KM at 372; Pilarinos, 864 E2d at 255-56;
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cerned a middle ground between a rigid repudiation of third party
entrapment and the adoption of an expansive vicarious entrapment
delense. 142
111. UNITED STATES V. HOLLINGSWORTH
In June 1994, in United States v. Hollingsworth ("Hollingsworth IP),
the Seventh Circuit, sitting en bane, held that an Arkansas orthodontist
and a farmer were not guilty of violating the federal money-laundering
statute because a United States customs agent had entrapped them
into the scheme.'" The first defendant in Hollingsworth II was Pickard,
an Arkansas orthodontist who had embarked on a distinct and quixotic
career in international finance, obtaining two foreign banking licenses
for that purpose.'" Having lost most of his initial investment, Pickard
placed an ad in USA Mday, offering up one of the licenses (a Grenadan
one) for sale."'" A U.S. customs agent read the ad and reasoned that
the seller might he amenable to a money laundering scheme. 146 After
a series of fits and starts, the two agreed to make a number of sig-
nificant cash deposits into an account that Pickard had established.' 47
One of Pickard's minor investors, an Arkansas farmer named
Hollingsworth, flew, for a $405 fee, to Indianapolis to retrieve one of
&rung, 820 E2d at 7; Anderton, 629 F.241 at 1(117; Jannoni, 501 F. Stipp. at 1202; McIntire, 591
P.241 at 531; Silva, 488 N.E,2d at 4112.
142 Compare Anderton, 629 E2d at 1047 with Beverly, 723 F.2d at 12, and Valencia, 645 F.2d at
1168.
143 27 F.3d 1196, 1'203 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.), affg; 9 E3d 593 (7th Cir. 1993). Although
this Note concerns itself mainly with the decision's implications for derivative entrapment,
Hollingsworth II also marks a significant re-interpretation of the predisposition prong of the
entrapment defense. See Martha Middleton, Seventh Circuit Departs on Entrapment: Experts Call
it a Dramatic Move, NAT'L, LJ„ Nov. 15, 1993, at 9. This is so because judge Pt)suer's opinion
interpreted Jacobson 14) have ratcheted up the Government's burden of proof from a showing of
mere "willingness" on the part of the defendant to engage in the crime in question to a showing
that the defendant was in "position" to engage in the crime prior to government involvement.
Hollingsworth II, 27 F.341 at 1199-200 (eking Jacobson v. United States, 112 S, Gt.. 1535, 1540-1543
(1992)). The court explained: "l'he defendant must be so situated by reason of previous training
or experience or occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that if the government had not
induced him to commit the crime sonic criminal would have done sold" Id. at 1200. One of
three dissenting opinions sounded a note of alarm: "No longer is it enough for the government.
to establish that the defendant was predisposed to commit. the crime; it must now also establish
his 'readiness' to do so." Id. at. 1214 (Ripple, .1„ dissenting).
144 Hollingsworth 11, 27 F.11(1 at 1200.
145 Id.
144 Id.
147 Id, at 1201,
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the deposits."8
 Upon Hollingsworth's return, police arrested him, as
well as Pickard, for money laundering. 149
After concluding that Pickard lacked the predisposition to engage
in money laundering absent the involvement of the government, the
court moved to the question of whether Hollingsworth was eligible to
raise an entrapment defense despite having had no direct contact
with the customs agent.' SD judge Posner's majority opinion began the
inquiry by noting the truism that "Where is no defense of private
entrapment."' 51
 Judge Posner denied that a private individual, i.e.,
Pickard, had induced Hollingsworth, insisting instead that Pickard
merely transmitted the inducement originally provided by the customs
agent.' 52
 Judge Posner conceded that the customs agent had never
suggested that Pickard involve Hollingsworth or anyone else but, none-
theless, balked at the "absurdity" of acquitting Pickard and convicting
Hollingsworth.'"
The Seventh Circuit stopped short of adopting the vicarious en-
trapment theory set forth by the Second Circuit in Valencia; the
Hollingsworth II court maintained that the middleman could not
merely occasion the entrapment of the distant defendant but must
communicate the inducement offered by the government in an unal-
tered form. 154
 Surveying the law surrounding third party entrapment,
Judge Posner concluded:
Perhaps the most accurate statement of the current law is that
while there is no defense of either private entrapment or
vicarious entrapment, there is a defense of derivative entrap-
ment: when a private individual, himself entrapped, acts as
agent or conduit for governmental efforts at entrapment, the
government as principal is bound.' 55
"5 Id.
149 Hollingsworth II, 27 F.3d at 1201.
1511 See supra note 143; Hollingsworth II, 27 F.3d at 1203. Hollingsworth did not raise the issue
of entrapment. at trial, preferring to rise and fall with a Due Process (i.e., Government Misconduct
or "fundamental fairness") argument. See supra note 23. Nevertheless, the court allowed him to
raise the entrapment defense on appeal because the government failed to argue waiver: "If
Hollingsworth waived entrapment by putting all his eggs in the 'fundamental fairness' basket ..
the government bailed him out by waiving waiver." Hollingsworth II, 27 F.3d at 1203.
151 Hollings-worth II, 27 F.3d at 1203.
15 '2 Id, at 1204.
153 Id.
15 • 1
155 1d.
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Although Judge Easterbrook dissented on the grounds that the
majority had misapplied Jacobson in altering the government's burden
in showing predisposition, he tentatively accepted the majority's rec-
ognition of a derivative entrapment defense,'" He conditioned his
acceptance, however, on a clear delineation between derivative and
vicarious entrapment.' 57 This delineation, Judge Easterbrook asserted,
involved not only the communication of the government's induce-
ment, but also some evidence that the middleman acted to further the
aims of the government in inducing the distant defendant. 15"
What Judge Easterbrook appeared to discern was that the majority
had not truly adopted a derivative entrapment scheme wholly distinct
from vicarious entrapment; rather, the majority had created a hybrid
defense somewhere between the two.' 59 Although the customs agent
supplied Hollingsworth's inducement, nothing in the record suggested
that he intended for Pickard to take on a partner in crime,m Perhaps
yielding to an equitable impulse, the Hollingsworth II court nonethe-
less held the government accountable for criminal activity beyond
the original scope of its operation, if not beyond the original degree
of it.'" 1
The Hollingsworth II court's "derivative entrapment" standard,
therefore, leaves itself open to the same uncertainty and complication
that vicarious entrapment engenders, in spite of the court's protest that
"(ojur case is different."' 62 Indeed, had Hollingsworth decided to divvy
up his fee with a dozen budding money-runners, who in turn pro-
ceeded to do the same, Hollingsworth II would afford all 145 a "deriva-
tive" entrapment. defense. ](?' Thus, in the end, the Hollingsworth II
court may have done the case for a derivative entrapment defense
more harm than good. 16'
156 Hollingsworth II, 27 F.3d at 1212 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
156 Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
155 Compare id. at 1204 with id. at 1212 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
1511 See id. at 1204.
161 See Hollingsworth 11, 27 F.3d at 1204-05,
162 M. at 1204.
1":1 See id.
164 See id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently declined to follow Hollingsworth 11,
reaffirming its per se rule against any form of third party entrapment in United Slates v. Manarite.
See Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1418 (9th Gir. 1995). In Manarite, the FBI hatched a chip-cashing
scheme at. a casino with the first defendant, who in turn involved his wife (the second defendant).
Id. at 1410. The Montane court proclaimed that "inducement is government conduct that creates
a substantial risk that an otherwise law-abiding person will commit a crime" but apparently
assumed that such conduct could not occur through an unwitting medium, returning to the
truism that "inducement by a private party is not entrapment." See id. at 1418 (citation omitted).
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IV, THE CASE FOR DERIVATIVE ENTRAPMENT
The final part of this Note falls in two portions. The first will distill
from all the case law touching upon derivative entrapment a more
reasoned standard for the defense.m The second will show how, so
structured, derivative entrapment. comports with the original logic and
purposes of the entrapment doctrine. 1156
A. A Structure for Derivative Entrapment
This Note proposes that courts adopt a more reasoned and struc-
tured approach to the derivative entrapment defense, one that turns
on two inquiries: (i) did the inducement offered to the distant defen-
dant originate with the government; and (ii) did the government
express designs on the distant defendant, in effect targeting him.lt" An
analysis of the cases that have, explicitly or implicitly, allowed for
derivative entrapment reveals that the courts make either or both
inquiries. 168 Applied together as joint burdens that a defendant must
overcome to raise a derivative entrapment defense, these requirements
provide a workable structure for derivative entrapment.
1. Inducement Originating With the Government
The first. requirement for defendants to raise a defense of deriva-
tive entrapment should be that defendants show that the inducement
offered them (through unsuspecting middlemen and fellow defen-
dants) originated with the government. 169 Courts have looked to this
issue because the inducement prong of the entrapment defense has
" 15 See i/lfra text accompanying notes 167-86.
11 th See infra text accompanying notes 187-202.
167
 See, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 936 F.2d 371, 372 (8th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing designs
on distant defendant); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 126—'27 (2d Cir. 1984) (emphasizing
continuity of inducement).
1" Compare Hollingsworth a 27 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring only continuity
of inducement) with United States v. Neal, 990 F2d 355, 358 (8th Cir. 1993) (requiring only
designs on distant defendant) and United States v.Jatntotti, 501 F. Stipp, 1182, 1202 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (requiring both), rev'd on other grirunds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982), affil, 729 F.2d 213
(3d Cir. 1983) (en banc), evil. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984).
169 United States v. Pilarinos, 864 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Toner, 728 F.2d at
126-27) ("A defendant is entitled to a derivative entrapment defense ... when 'the government's
inducement was directly communicated to the person seeking [the] entrapment charge' by an
unwitting middleman [I") (second alteration in original); cf, People v. Wielgos, 545 N.E.2d 1031,
1035 (III. App. Ct. 1989) ("[Illinois] does not require that the agent communicate only induce-
ments flowing directly from or originating with the officer or employer"), reo'd on other grounds,
568 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 844 (1992).
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been restricted traditionally to government (mis)conduct.' 7° Thus, in
Jannotti, where agents arranged beforehand the amounts of bribes to
offer to the defendants, the court found it determinative that the
agents, not the middleman, functioned as the source of all induce-
ments.' 71 The Hollingsworth II court also emphasized this prong, noting
that the first defendant merely "transmitted" the government's induce-
ment: to the second. 172
The Hollingsworth II court added, however, that if the middleman
alters or supplements the inducements initiated by the government,
then the distant defendant cannot raise a derivative entrapment de-
fense.'" The same sort of reasoning led the Silva court to focus, in
part, on the absence of a continuity of inducement in its refusal to
extend to the second defendant an entrapment delense. 174
2. Government Designs on Defendant:
The second requirement for defendants to raise a defense of
derivative entrapment should be that defendants show that the govern-
ment: targeted them in its investigation, rather than stumbling upon
them as windfall suspects. 175
 Otherwise, as the First Circuit: reasoned in
Bradley, entrapment would come into play even in situations in which
"the government is a stranger to the entire transaction." 17" In Anderton,
the Fifth Circuit Court, of Appeals upheld the defendant's derivative
entrapment defense, in part, because of evidence that the IRS agent
first mentioned him to the unsuspecting middleman and then repeat-
edly pressured the middleman to contact him.'" Similarly, in McIntire,
the Supreme Court of California focused on the undercover agent's
use of the defendant's brother to pressure her into committing a
crime. 175 Such conduct, the court concluded, "constitutes precisely the
170 Hodges, 936 F.2d at 372.
171 501 F. Supp. at 1197, 1202.
172 27 F.3d at 1204,
173 Id.
17 ' Commonwealth v. Silva, 488 N.E.2d 34, 41 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
170 Hodges, 936 F.2d at 372 ("Without evidence that the government induced ... the middle-
man into helping net the distant defendant, the government-action requirement or an enlVapmenl.
derciisc will not he met for that defendant,") (emphasis added); State v. Perez, 438 So. 2d 436,
439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("1W1here [the unsuspecting middleman] is used by [government
agent(s)1 For the purpose of getting a specific defendant or class of defendants involved in the
commission of a crime, the entrapment defense will lie.").
176 820 F.2d a' 7.
177 629 F.2d at 1047.
178 501 P.2d 527, 530 (Gal, 1979).
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sort of improper fostering of crime the entrapment defense is intended
to prevent." 79
In finding that the defendant in Silva had not raised a valid
entrapment defense, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals also looked
to whether the government had recruited the middleman in order to
get to the distant defendant.'" In that case, however, the court found
a dearth of evidence that the government had sought to use the
middleman, the proprietor of the bar, to draw the defendant, the bar
patron, into a drug-dealing scheme.'"' In United States v. Neal, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declined to recognize a deriva-
tive entrapment defense even though a DEA agent had engaged the
middleman who ultimately induced the defendant to commit the
crime. 182
 The Neal court found it determinative that the DEA agents
had set out to involve only the middleman, had never mentioned the
defendant and had never asked the middleman to involve him in the
scheme.'"
In summary, a workable derivative entrapment defense should
consist of two inquiries. The first would require defendants to show
that the inducements they relied on originated with the government.'"
The second would require defendants to show that the government
had some designs on .
 them originally.'" Taken together, these two
requirements prevent abuse of the defense by distant defendants while
still holding the government accountable for its actions.'"
B. Derivative Entrapment and the Purposes of Entrapment in General
The doctrine of entrapment serves two purposes: to deter the
seduction into crime of otherwise innocent citizens and to censure
government misconduct.'"' The first purpose represents the legacy of
the "subjective" theory of entrapment; the second represents that of
1711
18°488 N.E.2d at 41.
81 Id. at 41-42.
11'12 990 F.2d at 356-57.
110 Id. at 358.
See, e.g., Pitarinos, 864 F.2d at 256.
"k9 See Hodges, 936 F.2d at 372.
See infra text. accompanying notes 187-202.
IS?
 Delmar }{arien and J. Lawrence Schultz, Justice in the Accusation, in THE RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED IN LAW AND ACTION 133 (Stuart S. Nagel, ed., 1972). Karlen and Schultz set forth the
dual purposes of the entrapment defense:
It is commonly recognized that the entrapment defense is designed to protect two
different kinds of values threatened by police promotion of crime. First, "innocent"
people should not be seduced by the government to commit crimes.. .. Second,
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its all-but-moribund "objective" counterpart.'" Unlike other forms of
third party entrapment, derivative entrapment, properly defined, com-
ports with both.
1. Protecting Otherwise Innocent Persons
The Supreme Court has consistently made it clear that a prime
purpose of the entrapment defense is to prevent "unwary innocents"
from being drawn into criminal activity in which they would not oth-
erwise have engaged.'" Most recently, in Jacobson v. United States, the
Court reiterated the importance of this purpose to entrapment doc-
trine, refusing to countenance activities that arguably transformed a
law-abiding Nebraska farmer into a consumer of child pornography."'
The cases that have swept up potential derivative entrapment
defenses in per se rules against third party entrapment contravene this
core purpose of the entrapment doctrine. 191 Although these cases may
not have reached the wrong conclusions, their reasoning tends to lapse
into tautological pieties.'" 2 More problematically, by calcifying the law
around third party entrapment into a blanket prohibition, they forego
the flexibility necessary to address instances in which the government
targets an individual and induces that person to commit a crime
through an unsuspecting middleman. Such a prohibition thus runs
counter to the purpose of protecting otherwise innocent persons by
allowing the government to corrupt and then convict such citizens,
while insulating itself through an unwitting middleman.•"' In an age of
courts should not tolerate outrageous law enftircement practices, even if the defen-
dant is "really guilty."
188 See, e.g„ supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
189 See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1957).
199Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992). The dissent in Jacobson noted,
however, that Jacobson never showed himself at all unwilling to purchase child pornography, and
that he promptly ordered samples the two times that opportunity presented itself. Id. at 1543
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199-1200 (7th
Cir. 1994) (en Banc) (interpreting Jacobson as raising threshold for predisposition such that
prosecution must prove not only that defendant was willing, but also that defendant was in
position to act on willingness prior to government involvement).
191 See supra text accompanying notes 82-88.
192 See Thompson v. State, 290 N.E.,2d 724, 726 (Ind. 1972) (quoting United Stales v. Dc-
Loache, 304 F. Stipp. 183, 186 (W.D. Mo. 1969)) ("Where a third party, who does not know the
true identity of the Government agent, unwittingly leads the Government agent to the defendant,
there is no entrapment because it is the third party who induces the initial violation, not the
Government agent.."), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973).
193 See People v. McIntire, 591 P.2d 527, 530 (Cal. 1979). The California Supreme Court
noted,
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stings and reverse stings, a defense of derivative entrapment would
protect the otherwise innocent citizen from overweening government
agents acting at one remove."
2. Censuring Government Misconduct
The entrapment doctrine's second purpose involves the censure
of government, as opposed to private, misconduct.' 95
 Many of the deci-
sions that questioned the broad, vicarious entrapment holding of Va-
lencia did so out of concern that such a holding would render the
government accountable for inducements it never generated, for
crimes it never envisioned and for defendants it never targeted.' 96
The "derivative entrapment" defense promulgated by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Hollingsworth II goes halfway toward reining in this poten-
tial runaway accountability by requiring that the inducements offered
to the defendant originate with the government. 197
 Nonetheless,
Hollingsworth II does not require the government to have targeted the
defendant, leaving the door open to a potential line of unintended
defendants.I 98
Both of the requirements that this Note proposes for derivative
entrapment insure that the defense would hold the government liable
only for its deliberate behavior.' 9° The requirement that the middle-
man directly communicate the government's inducement to the de-
fendant ensures that the derivative entrapment defense will hold the
government liable for the original degree of its inducement:2° The
requirement that the government target the defendant directly simi-
larly ensures that the government will be held liable only for the
original scope of its inducement.m Thus structured, derivative entrap-
ment avoids the potential pitfalls inherent in vicarious entrapment,
The trial court apparently accepted the prosecution's claim that entrapment cannot
be effected through an unwitting agent.. .. ir such were the law, unconscionable
law enforcement activity would be permitted so long as the target of entrapping
agents was not reached directly but indirectly through the use of unsuspecting
dupes. Nothing in the doctrine of entrapment requires us to allow by indirection
such an irrational and dysfunctional result.
/4.
194 See A ndertort. 629 F.2d at 1047; fannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1202-03; McIntire, 591 P.2d at 530.
195 See Martinez, 979 F.2d at 1432; Carbajal-Portillo, 396 F.2d at 948.
19°
 See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
17 See Hollingsworth II, 27 F.3d at 1204-05.
194
 See id.
' 99 See supra notes 167-86 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 175-86 and accompanying text,
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including a proliferation of crimes and defendants that the govern-
ment never envisioned. 2"2
C. Conclusion
The conviction of the Florida Outlaws, described in this Note's
opening scenario, poses a real dilemma for entrapment as it now
stands." The key to the dilemma is in recognizing that the Tampa
Outlaws have more in common with subjects of' classic entrapment
than with the Daytona Outlaws, or even the St. Petersburg Outlaws.
This entails recognizing, in turn, that a viable defense of derivative
entrapment does not expand the parameters of traditional entrapment
so much as extend them to their logical dimensions, encompassing
scenarios in which the government entraps the distant defendant in-
directly, but deliberately. As the government resorts increasingly to
elaborate stings and undercover operations, the distant defendant
caught up in them should have recourse to a reasoned defense of
derivative entrapment; For not all such distant defendants are Outlaws.
JoHN E. NILSSON
21)2 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
